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CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
William B. T. Mock'
I. INTRODUCTION: GRACE AND OBLIGATION
In order for corporate support for human rights to become a routine
of corporate commitment, it must cease to be a matter of corporate grace
and rise to the level of corporate obligation. In other words, corporate
support for human rights must operate on the level of social, political, and
economic activity, however inspired such commitment may be from the
moral level. The essential practical distinction between the social,
political, and economic levels, on the one hand, and the moral level, on the
other, is that accountability for one's actions arise temporally in the former
spheres of action, whereas accountability or credit for moral actions must
await another, less visible world.
Corporations must, therefore, be made accountable in the coin of the
temporal, workaday world for their actions or inactions on issues of human
rights. Human rights activists and their supporters have long sought to
make corporations feel the consequences of their human rights abuses.
Such efforts, however, are largely sporadic and incidental (in the sense of
relating to particular incidents) or limited to one particular corporation or
another.'
t Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL, This article originated
as a speech presented at the 2000 Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association Section
on International Law and Practice, as part of a panel on Corporate Responsibility for
Human Rights. The author wishes to thank Professor Mark Wojcik of The John Marshall
Law School, who chaired the panel, for the opportunity he afforded the author to
participate in this forum.
1. Footwear manufacturers, like NIKE, and clothing manufacturers, like Kathie Lee
Gifford, have often felt the brunt of these sporadic efforts.
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II. STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS IN CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS
We have, fortunately, moved past the time when such efforts were
completely ad hoc, in that coalitions of human rights supporters had to be
hobbled together every time an egregious abuse surfaced. Today, with
groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,'
corporate and governmental institutional infrastructures for observing and
reacting to human rights abuses have been developed. As a consequence,
the human rights community is well organized, allowing for swift and
organized responses.
Structurally, this is only a part of what is necessary. It will probably
be impossible to organize in advance of abuses the likely victims of such
abuses. In advance, they are unidentifiable, politically vulnerable, and
perhaps unwilling to "rock the boat" for fear of inviting the very problems
we are addressing today. However, there are structural improvements that
we can make to the corporate community itself-improvements that will
allow for the systematic improvement of human rights just as fully as did
the creation of permanent and visible organizations dedicated to
uncovering and fighting human rights abuses.
At this point, let us take time to consider two concepts that will be key
to such structural improvements and to achieving the real-world corporate
accountability that we began considering at the beginning of this talk.
Those two concepts are transparency and separating equilibria. However
abstract and academic such terms may sound, they will provide a very
powerful set of tools towards achieving corporate accountability. We will
consider each in turn.
III. TRANSPARENCY
Transparency is a term much bandied about in organizational and
governmental studies these days.4 The World Bank, the Asian Develop-
2. The Amnesty International web site address is http://www.amnesty.org (last visited
Oct. 9,2000).
3. The Human Rights Watch web site address is http://www.hrw.org (last visited Oct. 9,
2000).
4. "Transparency is a flexible concept used in a variety of contexts, from financial
disclosure requirements to anti-corruption measures." EDWIN REKOSH, IN THE PUBLIC
EYE: PARLIAMENTARY TRANSPARENCY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 1 (Int'l Hum.
Rts. Law Group, 1995). See also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE: PROMOTING
SOUND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 32 (1997); Edgardo Boeninger, Governance and
Development: Issues and Constraints, PROC. [1991] WORLD BANK ANN. CONF. ON DEV.
ECON. 267, 284 (1992). "Corruption can undermine the effectiveness of institutions.
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ment Bank, and the OECD have looked at transparency as a precondition
to governmental accountability and democratic empowerment5 In
essence, transparency is a measure of the degree to which information
about significant procedures, plans, and actions is made available to
interested parties other than those creating the procedures, making the
plans, and driving the actions. Information and the costs of obtaining it is
the key to transparency.h
Ad hoc transparency may exist if an organization (public or private)
releases information in a particular matter without obligation to do so. In
a sense, this is transparency by grace. Structural transparency, on the
other hand, requires an ongoing obligation to release information. This
obligation may arise from legal mandate, overriding social pressure, or
sufficiently high and public levels of economic self-interest. Achieving
structural transparency in corporate life is--or should be-a high-level aim
of human rights activists.
A central effort of human rights activists concerned with corporate
behavior must, therefore, be to establish the conditions necessary for
corporations to establish structural transparency. Lobbying for corporate
disclosure laws is, obviously, one approach to this. In the United States,
such corporate disclosure laws have traditionally been tied to economic
issues, not social issues, however In a series of incidents dating from the
Vietnam-era shareholder activism movement, the SEC and the Appeals
Implementation [of policies] will improve if procedures are transparent, opportunities and
incentives for fraud are reduced, and officials are held accountable." Id.
5. See generally ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY
REGIMES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT: FINAL REPORT (1998)
(discussing regulatory encouragement of private sector development). Similarly, IMF
Study Group Report: Transparency and Evaluation (Jo Marie Griesgraber, chair) (Center
of Concern 1998) (considers the transparency of procedures of the IMF); ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DFVEI OPMENT, TRANSPARENCY FOR POSITIVE
ADJUSTMENT: IDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING GOVERNMENT ADJUSTMENT (1983); WORLD
BANK, PROC. [19911 WORLD BANK ANN. CONF. ON DEV. ECON. (1992); World Bank,
Limited Reductions in Agriculture-But Greater Transparency and a Framework for the
Future, DEC NOTES n.12 (May 1996).
6. For further development of this argument, consider: William Mock, An
Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A Tool for Rational Development, 18
DICK. J. INT'L L. 293 (2000); William Mock, Investment Consequences of Information
Hurdles in Smaller Developing Countries, 2 VYTAUTAS MAGNUS U. [LITHUANIA] L. REV.
108 (Jan. 2000); Wiliam Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational Choice
Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 1069 (1999).
7. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1246-73 (1999) (analyzing Nat. Resources Def.
Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and related cases).
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Court for the District of Columbia Circuit declared that social issues
lacking serious economic consequences were not part of the mandatory
prospectus and reporting requirements under the 1933 and 1934 securities
acts.' In effect, this is seen as an unwelcome attempt to muddy economic
issues and analysis with fuzzy social concerns.
IV. SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA
The game theoretical concept of separating equilibria provides an
alternative, and as yet underutilized approach to obtaining structural
corporate transparency. To see why this is so, we must first take a detour
into game theory itself-a branch of public choice or rational choice
analysis. Game theory, which traces its roots to Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior, a 1944 book by John Von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern,9 deals (often mathematically) with issues of strategic
interaction between parties seeking to maximize their own interests.
Perhaps the best-known product of game theory is the Prisoner's Dilemma
problem, ° which provides a thought-provoking model for the clash
between self-interest and community well-being in the context of
individual decision-making. Such familiar concepts as the free rider
problem," strategies for division of goods,12 and approaches to regulation
of the global commons 3 are also part of game theory.
Separating equilibria occur when incentives arise which cause parties
to act in ways that distinguish them from each other on the basis of
characteristics that might not normally be visible, thereby revealing those
hidden characteristics to all observers. In other words, parties who may be
similarly situated reveal themselves to be fundamentally different when
the right circumstances cause them to do so.
& Id.
9. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. Princeton) (1953).
10. For a review of the history of the Prisoner's Dilemma within game theory, see
WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992).
11. See, e.g., Gary Banks, Transparency, Surveillance and the GATT System, in IN WHOSE
INTEREST: DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 57 (Michael M.
Hart & Debra P. Steger, eds., 1992).
12 See, e.g., STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-
CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1996).
13. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCi. 1244 (1968); ELINOR OSTROM,




Perhaps the clearest way to understand this is to consider the value of
a bachelor's degree in the workplace." We are all familiar with statistics
indicating the increased earnings of college graduates over those with only
high school diplomas. One interesting aspect of those statistics is that, by
and large, it does not appear to matter what the graduate majored in, so
long as the degree was obtained. Another general observation is that most
employers of recent college graduates appear unconcerned by the choice
of major, so long as the grades were generally decent. Any college
graduate is better than anyone who did not attend college, without
reference to what was actually studied or learned.
An answer to this counter-intuitive observation lies in the use of
college educations to create a separating equilibrium among high school
graduates. Imagine, as is likely the case, that employers are more
concerned about an applicant's character than that person's knowledge: is
the person a motivated, hard-working, intelligent self-starter? Such
characteristics are not directly observable in a short encounter and must be
gleaned from an applicant's record. Yet the value of these qualities to
employers is well known, and all applicants will claim them on their
resumes in some way. Ideally, employers would put all applicants through
a quest-like the challenges set by ancient kings for the hands of their
daughters-that would scare away all but the most qualified candidates. In
modern society, college provides just such a quest or challenge. Those
incapable of finishing a college education, or those who find the very
prospect too daunting to pursue, are letting the world know that they lack
the very qualities that employers want but cannot learn by their own direct
observations."5 The higher effort required of such candidates to finish such
a daunting challenge causes such candidates to separate themselves from
the rest.
If corporations could be made voluntarily and openly to separate
themselves into those which would support human rights and those which
would ignore human rights, the work of human rights advocates could be
focused more sharply on the issues likely to produce the most productive
advances in human well-being. Simply put, a means must be found to
14. INES MIACHO-STADI.ER & DAVID PI REZ-CASTRILLO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS § 5.3 (1997); Louis PHLIPS,
TFHE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION § 5.1.3 (1988).
15. Unfortunately, a college education provides only an incomplete separating
equilibrium, because other factors could lead a bright and dedicated high school graduate
not to enter or finish college. For example, the employment market's use of a college
degree as a separating equilibrium, and the existence of obstructing factors extraneous to
such a use, provide strong arguments in favor of widely available financial aid to attend
college.
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make human rights reporting low-cost to corporations that respect human
rights and high-cost to those that do not. In this manner, respecters and
disrespecters will distinguish themselves clearly, and public posturing will
be rendered futile.
Easier said than done. In order for this to be more than an academic
exercise in angels dancing on the head of a tyrant, the theory must have
some practical ramifications. Let us now turn to practical realities.
V. CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND
VERIFICATION MECHANISMS
Some of the more familiar codes of conduct are the Sullivan
Principles16 (adopted to fight the South African apartheid system), the
MacBride Principles7 (adopted with reference to the sectarian problems in
Northern Ireland), the Arcos Principles'8 (adopted with reference to
Cuba), the Apparel Industry Partnership Workplace Code of Conduct,"
the Clinton Administration's Model Business Principles," and Social
Accountability 8000.21 All of these declare fine principles and ask that
multinational corporations sign on to these principles, either formally or by
observing them in practice. These corporate codes typically include
reference to various aspects of human rights, such as child labor," slave
labor,2 rights of racial equality,24 and occupational health and safety.
16. The (Sullivan) Statement of Principles (Fourth Amplification), Nov. 8, 1984, reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 1496 (1985) [hereinafter Sullivan].
17. Irish National Caucus, The MacBride Principles (1984 with 1986 amplifications),
available at http://www.knight-hub.com/inclMacBride.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2000)
[hereinafter MacBride Principles].
18. Rolando H. Castafieda & George Plinio Montalvdn, The Arcos Principles, available at
http://www.sigloxxi.org/arcos-i.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Arcos].
19. Apparel Industry Partnership, Preliminary Agreement Charter Document Fair Labor
Association, available at http://www.lchr.org/sweatshop/aipfull.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2000).
20. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Model Business Principles,
available at http://www.depaul.edu/ethics/principles.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2000)
[hereinafter Model].
21. Social Accountability International, Social Accountability 8000, at
http://www.cepaa.org/sa8000.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Social
Accountability 8000].
22. See, e.g., Apparel Industry Partnership, supra note 19, 3; Social Accountability 8000,
supra note 21, § IV.1.
23. See, e.g., Apparel Industry Partnership, supra note 19, 2; Social Accountability,
supra note 21, § IV.2.
24. See, e.g., MacBride Principles, supra note 17, passim. Principle 6, for example,
addresses "[t]he abolition of job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions and differential
[Vol. 8:1
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Substantively, this is wonderful, but the picture gets cloudier once
information policy and transparency are considered. The audit and
disclosure aspects of these codes reveal serious problems in using these
codes to distinguish between socially progressive companies and those that
prefer to ignore global social issues. The Sullivan Principles were perhaps
the strongest in this area: they required signatories to pay dues each year
for the purpose of funding outside compliance audits, which were then
made public.2'"
The MacBride Principles, by comparison, are purely substantive.
Corporations sign on to the Principles, but the Principles themselves
contain no procedures that lower information costs for those wishing to
learn whether a particular company is complying with them. A company
could thus claim adherence and yet resist calls to demonstrate that
adherence.
The Arcos Principles are closer to the Sullivan Principles in
procedure. They require companies to have public accounting firms audit
their compliance with the Principles, and report on that compliance by
using a standard form." Information on compliance will be made available
to shareholders and the media. Costs are supposed to be borne by the
employment criteria which discriminate on the basis of religion." Id. See, e.g., Social
Accountability 8000, supra note 21, § IV.5 Sullivan, supra note 16, passim (Principle I, for
example, calls for "[n]on-[s]egregation of the races in all cating, comfort and work
facilities.").
25. See, e.g., Arcos, supra note 18, at Principle V ("Each signatory of the Principles will
proceed immediately to ... [e]nsure that the methods of production meet occupational
safety and health standards, and that they do not pose unnecessary physical or health
hazards to the workers or surrounding communities."); Social Accountability 8000, supra
note 21, § IV.3.
26. The Sullivan Principles' section on Periodic Reporting required signatory companies
to: "Report progress on an annual basis to Reverend Sullivan .... Have all areas specified
by Reverend Sullivan audited by a certified public accounting firm. Inform all employees
of the company's annual periodic report rating and invite their input on ways to improve
the rating." Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1499. The requirement that companies pay dues to
support the Reverend Sullivan's work did not appear directly in the text of the Sullivan
Principles.
27. The Arcos Principles' section on Implementation reads, in part, as follows: "The
Signatory companies of the Arcos Principles will proceed immediately to: 1. Have all
points of the Arcos Principles specified above audited on an annual basis by an
internationally recognized certified public accounting firm. A reporting form to be
provided...." Arcos, supra note 18, § III(A)(1).
28. Signatories to the Arcos Principles are required to "[p]resent an annual progress
report ... to at least one human rights or independent labor organization in Cuba .... I d.
§ III(A)(2). Furthermore, signatories are required to "[i]nform all Cuban employees of the
company's annual report rating and invite their suggestions .... Id. § III(A)(3).
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corporations through voluntary contributions to the Principles'
administrators .29
The Clinton Administration's Model Business Principles are not an
operating code, but a design for corporations seeking to develop their own
codes of conduct.0 Unfortunately, they are purely substantive and contain
no provisions designed to lower information costs for observers outside the
corporation.
The Apparel Industry Partnership Workplace Code of Conduct
contains provisions for monitoring and audits,' but contains no specific
provisions for public disclosure of results.32 Social Accountability 8000,
from the Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation Association, by
contrast, has no provisions for external monitoring and audit, but requires
public disclosure of compliance with the substantive principles of the
program. 3 Neither, unfortunately, contains provisions for both external
monitoring and public disclosure.
In addition, there are the internal codes of conduct, which have been
adopted by multinational corporations themselves. Companies such as
Levi Strauss34 and NIKE35 have written their own codes, designed both for
their own internal operations and with respect to those companies that
have strong ties to them (notably upstream suppliers). These internal
corporate codes vary widely, and usually contain reporting standards as a
matter of grace, not as a matter of obligation. Thus, even if the substantive
standards are undertaken as an obligation, disclosure confirming
compliance with those standards may not be.
29. "Signatories and supporting organizations will be requested to make special
contributions to finance the effective implementation of this Program. By contributing to
financing the costs of this enterprise, including monitoring, Signatories will demonstrate
their good-faith adherence to the Arcos Principles." Id. § Ill(B).
30. The introductory language to the U.S. Department of Commerce Model Business
Principles states, in part, "the Administration encourages all businesses to adopt and
implement voluntary codes of conduct for doing business around the world." Model, supra
note 20, at 1.
31. Apparel Industry Partnership, supra note 19, §§ V, VI, and Principles of Monitoring.
32. Indeed, § V.D states that each Participating Company has the right to prevent
disclosure of the reports of external monitors, except for disclosures to the Fair Labor
Association created by the Apparel Industry Partnership itself. Id.
33. Thus, $ 9.11 requires regular communication to interested parties of "data and other
information regarding performance against the requirements." Social Accountability 8000,
supra note 21.
34. At http://www.levistrauss.com/about/code.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2000).
35. At http://nikebiz.com/labor/code.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2000).
[Vol. 8:1
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Finally, there are codes relating to particular industries. An example
of this is the RUGMARK codem relating to the production of rugs.
Compliance with such codes is usually indicated by a compliance mark that
is allowed to appear on the final product of every industry member
satisfying the substantive standards.
VI. ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY AND CREATING
SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA
What can be done to enhance the informational aspects of these
various types of codes, to render them more transparent? In terms of
separating equilibria, what can be done to make human rights reporting,
through means of these codes, low-cost to corporations that respect human
rights and high-cost to those that do not? There are several points worth
considering.
At the outset, let us consider what kinds of code provisions will not
create the differential reporting costs that will generate a separating
equilibrium. These fall into two types. The first type of code provision is
one that imposes no costs at all on corporations that abuse human rights.
More specifically, a code that provides no public reporting mechanism is
one that allows a multinational corporation to ignore the substantive
provisions with impunity. Without the transparency that comes with
public reporting of one form or another, no separating equilibrium will
form.
The second type of code provision that will not cause a separating
equilibrium to form is one that provides such lax enforcement and
reporting mechanisms that they allow such corporations to masquerade as
human rights respecters. Thus, a code requirement of a conclusory annual
public report, where no consequences are likely to arise from false
assertions of compliance with substantive provisions of the code, will
actually encourage lower-cost non-compliance rather than higher-cost
compliance, since both would lead to similar reports. Similarly, if code
compliance grants a company authority to use a certification mark on its
products, but the public is unaware of the existence or specifics of the
certification mark, then non-compliance is less expensive than compliance.
Such a situation can also arise where a non-complying company can easily
generate its own proprietary mark indicating that it has complied with its
own empty standards-meaningful marks risk being lost in a welter of
36. At http://www.rugmark.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2000) (see related links describing the
RUGMARK program and compliance mark).
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similar, but meaningless, marks. None of these circumstances will lead to a
separating equilibrium.
Then what will work? What kinds of code provisions will separate the
sheep from the goats, the corporate respecters of human rights from the
corporate violators? This is a complex question, to which answers are still
emerging, but some elements are coming clear from the existing codes and
some further developments can be identified.
First, corporate codes of conduct must create a common set of
standards and reporting formats. Those standards and reports must, in
addition, be made public to lower the information acquisition costs to
NGOs and concerned citizens. Second, there must be external review and
auditing of compliance. Such a step will lower information verification
costs to concerned parties. Having the companies themselves underwrite
the cost of such audits through contribution to a central fund, as was done
with the Sullivan Principles, is a particularly effective step: few non-
complying companies will wish to contribute the funds needed to
document their own violations.
A particularly useful aspect of such lowered acquisition and
verification costs is that it will also lower the costs of litigation against the
most egregious corporate abusers of human rights. In the Burma v.
Unocaf case, a federal district court in California upheld access to U.S.
courts for citizens of Burma who claimed that Unocal had effectively
enslaved them during the construction of an oil pipeline through their
country." Uniform standards and reporting, accompanied by external
audits, will threaten to provide an inexpensive evidentiary resource for
plaintiffs against corporate abusers of human rights. Corporations
conscious of their own record of abuses will have strong incentives to
reform their practices or to withdraw from (or never join) the code system,
thus creating a separating equilibrium.
A third aspect of corporate human rights codes that would impose
significantly higher costs on violators than on respecters of human rights
would be provisions requiring reporting companies to undertake steps that
actually promote human rights internally. For example, reporting
37. Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D.
Cal. 1997). See also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (plaintiffs
stated a claim against Unocal under the Alien Tort Claims Act by alleging collusion in
torture and enslavement by the Burmese military government). But see Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (Unocal motion for summary judgment under
Alien Tort Claims Act granted, on basis that Unocal did not exercise control over Burma's
decision to enslave the plaintiffs).
38. Under the military dictatorship controlling Burma, the country's name has been
changed to Myanmar. The U.S. government has not recognized this change.
[Vol. 8:1
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companies could be required, as a condition of code participation, to hold
regular human rights training conferences for their personnel
(representatives of labor as well as managers and suppliers), or to send
such people to human rights conferences sponsored by NGOs or other
credible groups. Both corporate respecters and corporate violators of
human rights will, of course, have to bear both opportunity and out-of-
pocket costs associated with such training and education, but violators will
have to bear the additional costs associated with maintaining their
violative practices in the face of a better-informed and better-connected
workforce.
Another development that could lower consumer information costs
and create higher costs for violators than for respecters has to do with
certification marks. Given the incredible range of items traded
internationally, it is extremely difficult for even well-meaning and well-
informed consumers to know the certification marks that apply to every
product or industry. Perhaps the time has come for the creation of a meta-
mark-a uniform super-certification that declares for consumers that a
particular industry or product certification mark is legitimate, meets
certain minimum criteria, and represents the state of the art of social
consciousness in the industry. The purpose of such a meta-mark would be
to allow consumers to become familiar with just one mark, which in itself
would guarantee that the industry-specific or product-specific mark
associated with it does indeed represent goods that have been produced in
compliance with global human rights standards. Once again, lowering the
information costs to concerned consumers will drive human rights abusers
to the tough choice of the separating equilibrium-bring yourself up to
global standards or forego the benefits of being part of the code system.
VII. CONCLUSION
The suggestions in this short essay, and in the presentation upon
which it is based, are not intended to represent a comprehensive analysis
of how to make corporate codes of conduct fully effective in promoting
human rights. Nor is this author making any claim that corporate codes of
conduct could be of value in all settings or for all products.q Rather, this
39. See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes:
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private
Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL'Y IN'T'L Bus. 111 (1998). In this excellent article, the author
identifies several limitations on the effectiveness of voluntary codes and labeling schemes,
including underreporting due to worker fear of displacement, ineffectiveness in non-
consumer branding, and unintended negative consequences on developing nations and
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essay has attempted to bring an informational perspective-based upon
the concepts of transparency and separating equilibria-to the discussion
of how to make corporate codes of conduct more effective. By lowering
information costs to parties concerned with human rights, and by raising
overall costs selectively for those multinational companies that ignore or
abuse human rights, we can make significant contributions to the cause of
human rights in the international corporate world. Human rights will then
become more a matter of regular corporate obligation than occasional
corporate grace.
complying corporations. See also Douglas Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human
Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963 (1996).
[Vol. 8:1
